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Introduction and summary
The auto industry in the United States directly employs
over 1 million workers, and is so large that gross mo-
tor vehicle output alone represents more than 3 per-
cent of the U.S. economy. In discussing its fortunes,
however, we often focus on the assembly segment of
the industry. Assembly-related activities represent only
the most visible part of this industry, the tip of the ice-
berg, if you will. Below the waterline lies the entire
supply structure that ultimately feeds into the assembly
line, at the end of which rolls off a car or light truck.
That part of the industry, which encompasses every-
thing from inputs such as steel coils to the subassem-
bly of entire vehicle interiors, is larger, both by count
of plants and employment, than the assembly part of
the industry.1 Yet our understanding of the auto sup-
plier industry is quite limited, mostly due to the nois-
iness of the publicly available data for that sector.2
From numerous trade and business press stories,
we know that the way auto suppliers relate to their
assembly customers has fundamentally changed over
the last 20 years. The main driver was the arrival of
lean manufacturing, a production system aimed at the
elimination of waste in every area of production in-
cluding product design, supplier networks, and factory
management, in North America during the early 1980s.
Since then, lean manufacturing production techniques
have become standard practice for auto assembly as
well as the largest supplier companies. Some auto as-
semblers even operate “supplier support organizations”
in order to transfer technology and knowledge to im-
prove the efficiency of operations at their suppliers.
Furthermore, assemblers no longer interact directly
with most of their suppliers. The number of indepen-
dent supplier plants assembly companies work with
directly has fallen greatly during the last ten years to
15 years. In turn, many suppliers now supply prima-
rily other supplier plants. At the same time, the Big
Three automakers, notably Ford and General Motors
(GM), have increased the share of parts they procure
from outside their company. For example, both Ford
and GM spun off many of their own parts plants as
independent companies several years ago. In addition,
the remaining assembler-owned parts plants have ex-
perienced rather dramatic job reductions over the last
few years (Klier, 2005). Finally, this industry, like most
manufacturing industries, has become noticeably
more international. As producers of cars and light
trucks pursue a global manufacturing footprint, their
main suppliers need to be able to meet the needs of
the assemblers globally (Roland Berger, 2004).
In estimating models of supplier plant location,
this article contributes to the current discussion of the
changing geography in the U.S. auto industry. The
ongoing loss of market share by the domestically head-
quartered producers to foreign-headquartered producers
of vehicles, both through imports as well as production
in the U.S., raises important questions about the location
trends for the industry (Klier, 2005).3 Between the
first quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2005, the
U.S. share of light-vehicle sales by Big Three name-
plates has fallen from 67.9 percent to 57.8 percent.
While some of that market share loss is attributable
to a rise in imports, most of it is explained by increased
U.S. production of foreign-headquartered assembly
companies. This matters for the geography of this in-
dustry as most of these “new domestic” assembly plants
in North America tend to be located farther south
than the assembly plants of the traditional domestic3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
producers. In fact, the assembly plants opened most
recently, such as the Honda plant in Lincoln, Alabama,
and the Nissan plant in Canton, Mississippi, have been
situated in the most southern area of the auto region.
As the geography of the auto sector continues to change,
one wonders whether Detroit can continue to be the
hub of this industry over the medium-term horizon.4
The public policy issues of a changing location pat-
tern in the auto sector are considerable as the traditional
auto states are struggling with this southward shift of
auto production and related economic activities.5 For
example, Michigan is currently suffering from its heavy
exposure to the domestic auto and parts makers. In her
2005 State of the State address, Michigan Governor
Jennifer Granholm proposed a sizable bond issue to
attract and retain jobs in the state. The business press
reported recently that Michigan is heavily recruiting
Toyota to locate one of two currently proposed assem-
bly facilities in the state (Hakim, 2005).
This article utilizes detailed plant-based data on
the U.S. auto supplier industry. After describing the
spatial properties of this data, I estimate two simple
models of plant location.6 I find the auto industry to
be strongly spatially concentrated. The core of the
auto region is densely packed with plants, reaching
from Michigan up into Ontario, west to Chicago, and
south to northern Alabama and into the Carolinas.
The states within the auto region show variations along
a number of dimensions. For example, the northern
half of the auto region is more densely populated by
domestic supplier plants7 whereas foreign plants are
more concentrated in the southern half. That pattern
is not surprising as it replicates the regional distribu-
tion of assembly facilities. Union plants are concen-
trated in Michigan, Indiana, and Ontario. Larger plants,
however, tend to be located farther away from Detroit.
A plant-level model of employment shows that plants
located farther from Detroit tend to have larger em-
ployment, as do tier 1 (discussed in detail later in the
text) and foreign-owned plants. In addition, I find plant
size to vary by type of part produced. Modeling plant
location choices of recently opened supplier plants at
the county level consistently finds the presence of an
interstate highway to be significantly related to plants
locating in such counties. In addition, the size of the
market, as measured by the number of assembly plants
within a day’s drive (approximately 450 miles) from
a county, is positively related to the number of recent-
ly opened plants in a county.
Literature review
Economic interest in agglomeration issues goes
back to at least Alfred Marshall (1920); for more
recent research, see Krugman (1991) and Ellison and
Glaeser (1997).
Regarding the question of what drives the geogra-
phy of the auto industry, a number of studies address
the reconcentration of assembly plants in the Mid-
west, a development which started in the mid-1970s.
Rubenstein (1992) attributes this to the demise of the
branch plant system, which was based on producing
identical models in plants located close to population
centers. The subsequent reconcentration of assembly
plants in the heart of the country was driven by an
increase in the choice of models available to the con-
sumer that far outpaced the growth of the market, re-
sulting in much reduced production runs per model.
As a result, individual models tend to support only a
single assembly plant. That plant is then best located
in the heart of the country, as the final product has to
be shipped all over the country from that one produc-
tion location.
Geographic trends in the supplier industry have
followed a different pattern. While this part of the auto
industry has remained remarkably concentrated in
the Midwest since the industry’s beginning over 100
years ago, it has experienced a migration of mostly
labor-intensive parts to the southern U.S. and Mexico
for some time. For example, in 2002, 73 percent of
all wiring harnesses—gatherings of electrical wires
terminating in a central plug that distribute electricity
in a car to operate the turn signals, brake lights, etc.—
“consumed” in the U.S. were imported, 82.7 percent
of which were produced in Mexico.
There is evidence that, within the auto region,
assembly and supplier plants want to locate in prox-
imity to one another (see Smith and Florida, 1994, for
a model for Japanese-affiliated manufacturing estab-
lishments in auto-related industries). State of the art
supply chain management requires most supplier plants
to be located within a day’s drive from the assembly
plant customer (see Klier, 1999, and 2005). And so,
supplier networks of individual assembly plants are
of a regional nature, as the existing transportation in-
frastructure allows for reliable on-time delivery of
products (see Woodward, 1992, and Smith and Florida,
1994, for the importance of highway transportation).
Yet, as the auto industry continues to be very
highly concentrated across space, the geographic
extension of its core region has changed. No longer
reaching eastward from Detroit to Pennsylvania and
New York, it now is defined in a marked north–south
direction, extending from Detroit to Kentucky and
Tennessee and beyond with fingers reaching north
into Canada and south into Mexico. In other words,
the core auto region has pivoted around Detroit over4 3Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
TABLE 1
Largest auto supplier companies, 2003
OEM automotive parts sales ($ bn.)
Rank Company name HQ in North America Worldwide
1 Delphi Corp. U.S. 19.5 25.5
2 Visteon Corp. U.S. 11.1 16.9
3 Lear Corp. U.S. 9.4 14.4
4 Magna International CDN 9.1 12.4
5 Johnson Controls Inc. U.S. 8.0 13.7
6 Dana Corp. U.S. 5.5 7.3
7 Robert Bosch Corp. GER 5.0 19.1
8 TRW Automotive Inc. U.S. 4.6 9.9
9 Denso International America Inc. J 3.9 15.3
10 ThyssenKrupp Automotive AG GER 3.7 6.2
11 American Axle U.S. 3.5 3.5
12 Collins & Aikman U.S. 2.9 3.9
13 DuPont Automotive U.S. 2.8 5.4
14 Continental AG GER 2.3 5.6
15 Yazaki North America J 2.2 5.8
93.5 164.9
Note: OEM is original equipment manufacturer; CDN is Canada; GER is Germany; and J is Japan.
Source: Automotive News, available at www.autonews.com/datacenter.cms?dataCenterId=129, by subscription.
several decades. During the last few years this devel-
opment has gained greater attention as the old-line auto
states have been losing production and employment
to the southern end of the auto corridor. The chang-
ing fortunes of domestic and foreign assembly plant
customers appear to be profoundly reshaping the re-
gional distribution of supplier employment (Klier, 2005).
How to measure the auto supplier industry?
Overview of the supplier industry
For the purpose of this article, auto suppliers are
companies that supply light-vehicle assembly com-
panies.8 Among them, one can distinguish the follow-
ing categories: suppliers that deal directly with the
assembly company and those that deal primarily with
other suppliers. The first category is commonly re-
ferred to as tier 1 suppliers, while the other category
is referred to as tier 2 suppliers. The number of tier 1
suppliers has been shrinking over the last decade, as
assemblers have been reducing the number of com-
panies they do business with directly. At the same time,
that segment of the supplier industry has been sub-
ject to a series of mergers and acquisitions. Finally,
there are a number of tier 1 parts operations that are
owned and operated by the assemblers themselves,
such as engine and stamping facilities. These are
generally referred to as captive suppliers. A number
of years ago the two largest U.S. assemblers decided
to spin off the majority of their captive parts opera-
tions. In 1999, GM spun off most of its captive plants
as Delphi, which instantly became the largest inde-
pendent tier 1 auto parts supplier. One year later, Ford
Motor Company divested a large number of its cap-
tive plants as a separate company called Visteon. It
then became the second largest independent parts
supplier in North America.9 Table 1 lists the 15 largest
auto supplier companies as ranked by the industry
weekly Automotive News in 2003 based on sales in
North America. The 50 largest suppliers on that list
each have global sales exceeding $1 billion, amounting
to a total of about $285 billion. If one classifies these
companies based on the location of their headquarters,
the following pattern emerges: 53 percent of the 150
largest suppliers represent companies based in one of
the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)
countries, 20 percent are from Japan, and the remain-
ing 27 percent are from Europe. This illustrates the
degree of global competition present in this industry.
Plant-level data
The analysis of auto supplier plants presented in
this article is based on data acquired from ELM Inter-
national, a Michigan-based vendor. While not designed
with research applications in mind, the ELM database
is intended to cover auto supplier companies and their
plants in North America.10 The database provides 3,542
plant-level records. Included is information on a plant’s5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
address, employment, parts produced, customer(s),
union status, as well as square footage. In order to
clean up the data for research purposes, several oper-
ations were performed. First, records were cross-checked
with state manufacturing directories to obtain informa-
tion on the plant’s age.11 We also appended information
on the nationality of the company to the record of each
plant from the ELM company-level data.12 Plants of
supplier companies listed in the 2003 Automotive
News “top 150 automotive suppliers list” were coded
with the companies’ ranks in that listing. Information
on captive parts plants was also checked with Harbour
(2003). For all the Automotive News top 150 compa-
nies, the accuracy and completeness of ELM’s plant
listings—that is, the number of plants as well as their
location—was crosschecked with the companies’ web-
sites when possible.13 Overall, that resulted in a net
addition of 335 records. Finally, the accuracy of the
employment for the largest plants (employment greater
2,000) was also checked with company websites or
phone calls. After this preparation the data consists
of 3,877 observations of auto supplier plants located
in the U.S. and Canada (see table 2).14 To my knowl-
edge, this may well be the most accurate plant-level
description of the North American auto supplier in-
dustry currently available.
Table 2 summarizes the supplier plant data for the
U.S. and Canada along several dimensions. Of the
3,877 plants more than half are characterized as low-
er tier suppliers. That is, they primarily do business
with other supplier companies. These plants tend to be
smaller (their average employment is 241) than tier 1
suppliers (average employment of 388), which make
up 42 percent of all plants. Captive suppliers, while
small in numbers, represent by far the largest plants.
Their average employment is above 1,000. Of the
three groups, captive plants tend to be located closest
to Detroit. The union variable covers only 83 percent
of all plants; 25 percent are unionized, while 58 per-
cent are not. Unionized plants have larger employment
and are located closer to Detroit than nonunion plants.
As for ownership, just under 80 percent of supplier
plants are part of a company that has its headquarters
in the U.S., Canada, or Mexico. “Foreign” plants are
larger and are located farther away from Detroit than
“domestic” plants. Finally, a quarter of the plants ap-
pears to be single-establishment firms.15 These plants
show the lowest average employment of all groups
listed in table 2.
Spatial characteristics of the auto
supplier industry
This plant-level data allows a fairly detailed de-
scription of the spatial properties of the auto supplier
industry. Figure 1 shows the distribution of auto sup-
plier plants. It represents all 3,877 U.S. and Canadian
plants in the data set, aggregated to the zip code level
of detail. The symbols representing supplier plants are
scaled to convey the spatial density of plant locations.
The most interesting feature of the map is the
high degree of clustering exhibited by this industry.
It is self-evident that southern Michigan represents
the hub of the North American auto sector.16 The core
region of this industry extends from that area west to
Chicago, northeast to Toronto, and south to Tennessee
and arguably into northern Mississippi, Alabama,
Georgia, and the Carolinas.17 Pennsylvania represents
the link between the heart of the industry in the
Midwest and a cluster on the East Coast. West of the
Mississippi the country is mostly empty of auto sup-
plier activity except for a thinly populated band that
extends from eastern Texas and northern Louisiana
TABLE 2
Supplier data summary, U.S. and Canada, 2003
% of % of Average Median distance
plants employment employment to Detroit (miles)
Tier 1 suppliers 41.7 49.5 388 253
Captive suppliers 2.7 9.5 1,153 136
Lower tier suppliers 55.6 40.9 241 218
Union 25.3 38.0 491 180
Nonunion 58.1 52.0 293 256
Domestic 79.2 77.3 319 210
Foreign 20.8 22.7 357 309
Single plant 24.0 17.0 236 198
Multiplant 76.0 83.0 400 247
All 100 100 327 237
Note: Based upon 3,877 observations at auto supplier plants.6 3Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
north to Nebraska and Iowa and into Minnesota. Other
than that, one can observe two clusters in California,
one in the Bay area and the other in the L.A. basin.
Finally, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico
are home to small localized clusters, and the border
between Texas and Mexico shows centers of activity
around El Paso and Laredo/Brownsville. These are
related to border crossings that link the Mexico-based
maquiladora plants to the U.S.-based suppliers.18
Table 3 provides further detail on the distribution
of plants and employment in the auto supplier indus-
try. The information is first summarized by the four
Census regions plus Canada (see panel A). The bot-
tom panel of the table provides an alterantive break-
down of the data, focusing on the two halves of the
auto corridor. Column 2 shows that 90.1 percent of
all 3,877 plants are located in the Midwest, South, or
Canada. Michigan alone is home to 22.5 percent of
all auto supplier plants, followed by Ohio (11.6 per-
cent) and Ontario (10.7 percent). The auto corridor
as a group represents just under 79 percent of all auto
supplier plants in the U.S. and Canada. Columns 3–8
of table 3 provide three different breakdowns of the
location of auto supplier plants.
Grouping supplier plants by nationality of com-
pany, one can see that the auto corridor consists of two
halves: The northern end shows a higher concentration
of domestic plants (64.7 percent) and lower concen-
tration of foreign-owned plants (46.7 percent) than
overall. Likewise, the southern end shows a much
higher concentration of foreign-owned supplier plants
(33.7 percent) and a smaller share of domestics (13.8
percent). In addition, 21.5 percent of domestic auto-
motive supplier plants in the U.S. and Canada (and
19.6 percent of foreign ones) are located outside the
auto corridor. The share of foreign supplier plants lo-
cated at the southern end of the auto corridor is 2.4
times as large as the share of domestic plants. This
pattern suggests an influence of the location of the pri-
mary customer on the supplier plant location (Klier,
1999, and Smith and Florida, 1994). The median dis-
tance of foreign-owned supplier plants to Detroit is
309 miles, noticeably larger than the 210 miles for
domestic supplier plants (see table 2).19 One can argue
that in setting up operations in North America, foreign
suppliers choose locations close to foreign-owned as-
sembly plants, which presumably were their prime
customers at that time.
The tier status of a supplier plant is measured by
its inclusion in Automotive News’ top 150 supplier com-
panies list. That is a somewhat arbitrary yet plausible
way to define which plants are tier 1 plants. In essence,
it assumes that all of the large supplier companies’ plants
deal directly with assembly plants. Since captive
FIGURE 1
Distribution of auto supplier plants
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.8 3Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
suppliers tend to interact directly with assembly plants,
they are grouped with tier 1 plants in table 3. While
generally very similar in their regional distribution,
tier 1/captive plants are more prevalent in the South
and less so in the Northeast.
Table 3 also shows a disproportionate concentra-
tion of unionized supplier plants in the Midwest and
Ontario.20 Nonunionized plants, on the other hand, are
concentrated in the South where many states have right
to work laws. Within the auto corridor, this split shows
very strongly. Seventy-two percent of all union plants
are found in the northern end of the auto corridor.
Correspondingly, they are quite rare in the southern
end (7.8 percent of all unionized plants versus 21.4
percent of all nonunionized plants).
The location of employment, shown in columns
9–15, resembles the location of plants, column 2, very
closely in the aggregate. The auto corridor is home to
76.6 percent of the industry’s employment and 78.8
percent of its plants. At a more disaggregate level,
table 3 reveals a regional difference in the geography
of plants and employment, indicating that plants lo-
cated in the northern end of the auto corridor tend to
have, on average, fewer employees. For example, em-
ployment at foreign-owned plants is noticeably more
concentrated in the southern half of the auto corridor
than employment at domestic plants. The foreign-owned
plants located in the south also tend to be dispropor-
tionately large, as measured by employment. They
represent 33.7 percent of all plants, yet 36.2 percent
of all employment in the sector. In contrast, both do-
mestic and foreign-owned plants located in the north-
ern half are disproportionately smaller; that is, they
represent a smaller share of industry employment
than of plants. However, that pattern does not apply
to unionized plants. For example, Michigan is home
to 26.9 percent of unionized plants and 29.1 percent
of employment at unionized plants.
Formal analysis of employment and
plant distribution
This section reports on two formal models to es-
timate the location of employment as well as plant
distribution. The idea is to formally test what underlies
the observed agglomeration in the auto supplier industry.
The models utilize data on U.S. plant locations only.
Table 4 lists the summary statistics for both the plant-
level as well as the county-level models reported.
First, we regress plant-level employment on a
number of plant-level characteristics that the detailed
database allows us to draw on. The model also uses a
number of variables that are measured at the county
level, such as the presence of an interstate highway.
The model incorporates that information only for coun-
ties in which plants are actually located. That explains
why the mean of the interstate highway variable is
0.78 in the plant-level model: 78 percent of plants
are located in counties that are reached by an inter-
state highway.
The geography of plants is measured by two dif-
ferent variables. DISTANCE measures the straight-
line distance between the centroid of the zip code in
which the supplier plant is located and the centroid
of the zip code for downtown Detroit.21 Detroit seems
an obvious spatial reference point as it is clearly the
hub of this industry. VDISTANCE measures distance
to Detroit only in the north–south direction. In addition,
the following set of plant characteristics is included
in the model. A set of dummy variables indicating if
the plant is part of a single plant company; if it is
part of one of the largest 150 supplier companies;22
if it is an assembler-owned supplier plant (CAPTIVE);
if it is unionized;23 and if its headquarter operations
are located outside North America. In addition, a group
of dummy variables controls for what subsystem of
the car the plant’s output feeds into (table 5, p. 10).24
Finally, the model includes a control variable for
counties in right-to-work states as well as a couple
interactive terms of the plant control variables.
Table 6 (p. 11) reports the results of three differ-
ent specifications and the variables used in construct-
ing each of them. A simple model (specification 1)
can explain about 20 percent of the variation in the
dependent variable. In addition, the model identifies
a statistically significant relationship between the
plant-level employment and tier status as well as na-
tionality of headquarters: Plants of tier 1 supplier com-
panies as well as plants of foreign-headquartered
companies are found to have larger employment. The
presence of unions in a supplier plant is only related
to larger plant employment if the plant is either cap-
tive or part of a tier 1 supplier company. That is to
say, unionized plants are larger than others only if
they are either tier 1 or captive plants. Specification 2
controls for what the supplier plants are producing
by distinguishing 8 major subsystems of a car. Employ-
ment at plants producing parts for chassis (such as tires),
body, engine electrical (which includes the electron-
ics components suppliers), and engine attached (of-
ten referred to as air and fuel handling) is consistently
found to be larger than that of the control group, plants
that produce generic parts. Finally, specification 3
controls for a number of county-level characteristics
that might influence plant location decisions, such as
the degree of local work force education, transporta-




Plant-level All new All new All new
model plants domestic foreign
Employment 359.922
(473.248)
Share of young supplier plants 0.042
0.162
Share of domestic young suppliers 0.0229
0.114




Distance to Detroit (miles) 361.933 456.174 456.174 456.174
(388.950) 205.216 205.216 205.216
Vertical distance to Detroit (miles) 203.768
(220.904)
Single plant company 0.257
Plant part of top 150 supplier 0.363
Plant is captive 0.024
Plant is unionized 0.262
Company headquarters outside North America 0.206
Right-to-work state 0.237 0.467 0.467 0.467
Interaction top 150 and unionized 0.106
Interaction captive and unionized 0.019
Parts for body (%) 0.142
(0.297)
Parts for chassis (%) 0.199
(0.329)
Parts for drivetrain (%) 0.039
(0.144)
Parts for engine attached (%) 0.103
(0.249)
Parts for engine electrical (%) 0.071
(0.225)
Parts for engine (%) 0.093
(0.238)
Parts for interior (%) 0.149
(0.312)
Generic parts (%) 0.186
(0.335)
Presence of interstate highway 0.787 0.506 0.506 0.506
(0.411) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Share of employment in manufacturing 25.536 23.807 23.807 23.807
(8.218) (9.93) (9.93) (9.93)
High school education (%) 0.74 0.672 0.672 0.672
(0.082) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
Population in 1990 (million) 0.515 0.093 0.093 0.093
(1.092) (0.227) (0.227) (0.227)
No. of supplier plants in county 19.355 1.335
(31.025) (4.818)
No. of domestic supplier plants in county 1.072 1.072
(4.328) (4.328)
No. of foreign supplier plants in county 0.263 0.263
(0.804) (0.804)
No. of assembly plants within 450 miles 37.113 31.223 31.223 31.223
(16.074) (16.197) (16.197) (16.197)
No. of domestic assembly plants in county 22.842 22.842
(13.523) (13.523)
No. of foreign assembly plants in county 8.381 8.381
(3.693) (3.693)
No. of observations 3,097 1,607 1,607 1,607
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses for continuous variables.10 3Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
supplier and assembly companies. However, the coun-
ty-level variables do not add to the plant-level model
of employment (table 6).
Next, I estimate a model of plant location at the
county level (table 7, p. 12). The dependent variable is
the share of supplier plants in a county that opened re-
cently.25 As the underlying data is cross-sectional in
nature, it seems prudent to focus on location decisions of
more recently established plants.26 Going back much fur-
ther in time could introduce survivor bias to the model.
The premise is that county characteristics matter in plant
location decisions. The model accounts for the presence
of existing assembly and supplier plants to capture pos-
sible agglomeration effects within the auto industry.
The number of assembly plants located within
450 miles of a county’s centroid measures the size of
the market available to a supplier locating in that
county. That is an important reference point as the
ability to deliver reliably within a day is a key require-
ment of the just-in-time production system. The dis-
tance of 450 miles corresponds to an industry rule of
being able to deliver within a day’s drive. The model
also includes a measure of how many sup-
pliers had previously located in a county
to account for agglomeration effects. Fi-
nally, the set of county-level controls used
in specification 3 of the plant-level model
(table 6) is included in the county-level
model as well. Table 7 reports the results
that utilize information for all counties east
of the Mississippi to capture the region
of the country most densely populated by
the auto industry.27
Across all specifications estimated,
the presence of an interstate highway in a
county is consistently associated with a
higher share of recently opened supplier
plants in that county. In addition, the size
of the market for suppliers, as measured
by the number of assembly plants within
a day’s drive from a county, is related to
suppliers choosing a county. Specifications
2 and 3 distinguish domestic and foreign
plants, both for the dependent as well as
the independent agglomeration variables.
It turns out that only the presence of foreign
assembly plants within a 450 mile radius
is significantly related to the incidence of
both domestic and foreign “young” sup-
plier plants locating in a county.
Simulation of policy effects
Based on the model results presented
in table 7, I perform two simple simulation exercises.
The idea is to elicit from the model what the estimated
response in the distribution of supplier plants would
be to a simulated change in the location of an assem-
bly plant. First, assume that Tennessee has one less
light-vehicle assembly plant and Michigan has one
more. I assume Spring Hill as the location of the plant
in Tennessee, and Grand Rapids for the fictional plant
in Michigan. Subsequently, I re-calibrated the variable
that measures the number of assembly plants located
within a 450-mile radius of each county. To that re-
configured variable and all the others in the model,
the estimated coefficients as reported in table 7 were
subsequently applied. In doing so one performs what
is referred to as an “out-of-sample” forecast. In essence,
one can simulate what would happen to the distribu-
tion of young supplier plants if Grand Rapids had an
assembly plant and Spring Hill did not. Constraining
the estimation to result in a zero sum redistribution
of supplier plants, the following result emerges. The
three states of Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio would
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Source: ELM and author’s calculations.11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 6
Estimation of plant employment
Specification Specification Specification
Variable 1 2 3
Distance to Detroit 0.113** 0.097** 0.107**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.046)
Vertical distance to Detroit –0.095 –0.112 –0.144
(0.067) (0.067) (0.075)
Single plant company –5.370 2.270 4.470
(19.850) (19.927) (20.022)
Top 150 supplier 152.368** 149.414** 147.093**
(20.823) (21.312) (21.356)
Captive supplier 169.406 204.883* 204.998*
(108.186) (108.325) (108.376)
Unionized plant 21.976 25.07 25.253
(23.711) (23.634) (23.654)
Headquarters outside North America 79.872** 59.633** 56.298**
(19.685) (19.816) (20.002)
Right-to-work state 49.263* 49.432* 42.641
(28.268) (28.245) (32.975)
Top 150 supplier and unionized 293.919** 281.682** 284.626**
(36.616) (36.471) (36.544)
Captive supplier and unionized 952.425** 926.215** 937.641**
(123.098) (121.933) (122.275)
Chassis % 205.226** 199.212**
(29.870) (29.977)
Drivetrain % 90.164 90.000
(56.584) (56.590)
Interior % 18.102 11.047
(30.334) (30.473)
Body % 56.473* 52.878*
(31.771) (31.815)
Engine % 50.999 41.566
(38.084) (38.295)
Engine electrical % 304.689** 303.297**
(38.824) (38.885)
Engine attached % 141.791** 135.461**
(35.394) (35.537)
Presence of interstate highway 29.881
(20.828)
Manufacturing employment (%) 2.016*
(1.145)
High school education (%) –0.897
(1.342)
Population in 1990 –1.24.970
(924.818)
No. of supplier plants in county –0.546
(0.336)
No. of assembly plants within 450 miles –0.016
(1.034)
Constant 193.497** 114.932** 127.432
(16.850) (23.081) (134.086)
No. of observations 3,097 3,050 3,050
R squared 0.19 0.22 0.22
**Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.12 3Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
TABLE 7
Supplier plant locations between 1994 and 2003
All Domestic only Foreign only
No. assembly plants w/450 miles 0.001**
(0.00)
No. domestic assembly plants w/450 miles –0.001 0
(0.001) 0
No.  foreign assembly plants w/450 miles 0.004** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001)
No. existing supplier plants 0
(0.001)
No. existing domestic suppliers 0 –0.001
(0.001) 0
No. existing foreign suppliers 0.003 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Interstate highway 0.03** 0.012** 0.014**
(0.009) (0.006) –0.006
Right to work state 0.019 –0.005 0.007
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Share of manuf. employment 0.001** 0.001 0
0.000 0 0
Percent high school ed. 0 0.001* 0
(0.001) 0 0
Population, 1990 0.03 0.027* 0.011
(0.021) (0.015) (0.015)
Distance to Detroit 0 0 0
0.000 0.000 0.000
Constant –0.62 –0.033 –0.018
(0.065) (0.046) (0.045)
Observations 1,607 1,607 1,607
R squared 0.03 0.02 0.02
**Significant at the 5% level.
 *Significant at the 10% level.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Observations: 1,607. Model is estimated for all counties east of the Mississippi.
between 1995 and 2003 by 42, from 122 to 164. The
three states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama would
see their count of young supplier plants fall by 37, from
65 to 28. The simulated redistribution represents about
14 percent of all young supplier plants opened during
the last 10 years. That represents a significant impact.28
A second experiment consisted allocating a for-
eign assembly plant in Michigan (again, Grand Rapids),
instead of Spartanburg, South Carolina, and estimating
the effect on the distribution of foreign-owned young
supplier plants (there were 107 of them that opened
between 1995 and 2003). Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio
would gain young foreign suppliers. The count for
the three states would increase by 27 from 30 to 57.
By the same token, South Carolina and the surround-
ing auto corridor states North Carolina, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia would have received
fewer recently opened foreign suppliers: Their plant
count of foreign young would go down by 26 from 57
to 31.29 According to this simulation, placing one for-
eign assembly plant into Michigan instead of South
Carolina would affect the location of a quarter of all
foreign supplier plants opened between 1995 and 2003.
Conclusion
This study set out with the intent to shed more
light on the geography of the auto parts sector which
is far less understood than that of the auto assembly
sector of the auto industry. The analysis of a rich plant-
level data set with records of almost 3,800 auto sup-
plier plants located in the U.S. and Canada shows an
industry that is very spatially concentrated. Today
Detroit remains the center of a highly clustered auto
region that extends north–south from Michigan, reach-
ing up into Ontario, west to Chicago, and south to
northern Alabama and into the Carolinas. While the13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
analysis is purely cross-sectional, it reveals a surpris-
ing amount of variation in the location pattern exhib-
ited along a number of dimensions. The study confirms
the north–south split within the auto region by nation-
ality of plant: Plants of domestically headquartered
suppliers are concentrated in the northern end of the
auto corridor and plants of foreign-headquartered sup-
pliers are concentrated in the southern end. Overall,
employment and plants are distributed quite similarly.
A plant-level model of employment shows that
plants located farther from Detroit tend to have greater
employment, as do tier 1 and foreign-owned plants.
In addition, we find plant size to vary by type of part
produced. A simple model of recent supplier plant
openings at the county-level points out the importance
of regional transportation infrastructure. The presence
of interstate highway access in a county is consistently
related to a higher share of recently located supplier
plants. Furthermore, the number of assembly plant
customers reachable within a day’s drive is also related
to supplier location choices. This finding points to the
continued importance of agglomeration in this industry.
A policy simulation asks what the effect of a change
in the location of one assembly plant would be on
the geography of recent supplier plant openings. Two
different simulations are presented, one moving an
assembly plant from Tennessee to Michigan, the other
moving a foreign assembly plant from South Carolina
to Michigan. Both suggest a sizable regional effect
on the location of supplier plants. A number of them
would have located closer to the “new” location of
the assembly plant as they need to be within 450 miles
of their assembly plant customers.
NOTES
1U.S. motor vehicle parts employment is about four times as large
as employment in motor vehicle assembly.
2Many different manufacturing sectors contribute to the production
of vehicles and at the same time supply non-automotive custom-
ers. Furthermore, the census data on shipments do not distinguish
between producers of parts for the aftermarket and the original
equipment market. The 2002 Census of Manufacturing, however,
reports the cost of materials used in U.S. light-vehicle assembly
plants at $152.5 billion. That measure includes imported parts.
3In addition, factors such as the continuing consolidation and in-
ternationalization within the supplier industry also affect its spa-
tial structure.
4The northern end of the auto corridor is home to over half of all
light-vehicle assembly plants in the U.S., 81 percent of these are
Big Three facilities. Conversely, the southern end of the auto
region is home to about 20 percent of all light-vehicle assembly
plants; half of these are foreign producer facilities. Testa, Klier,
and Mattoon (2005) identify such a regional shift as the most
likely structural threat to the Midwest’s economy.
5See the speech of Michigan’s Governor Granholm from August 4,
2004, in which she outlines a framework on how Michigan should
respond to the current challenges facing its most important manu-
facturing sector. See also McAlinden and Hill (2003).
6The role of the border is not addressed in this article. Post 9/11,
elevated national security concerns have exacerbated demands on
the already strained border infrastructure between the U.S. and
Canada, potentially affecting plant location decisions in an indus-
try that continues to be very tightly integrated and has straddled
both sides of the border for many years (see Simon, 2004, and Klier
and Testa, 2002).
7“Domestic” refers to supplier companies which are headquar-
tered in either the U.S., Canada, or Mexico, “foreign” to compa-
nies headquartered elsewhere.
8The term light vehicles refers to passenger cars and light trucks,
which include minivans and sport utility vehicles.
9See White (2005) on the recent restructuring of the original agree-
ment between Ford and Visteon.
10Data are available at the plant and company level. However, plants
producing primarily for the aftermarket are not part of database,
nor are plants that produce raw materials, such as steel and paint.
The ELM data were purchased at the end of 2003. The database
is continuously updated by the vendor.
11Plants for which no matching records were found were contacted
by phone.
12Based on the location of company headquarters, the article dis-
tinguishes North American (U.S.-, Canadian-, or Mexican-owned
plants), Japanese, as well as other foreign-owned plants.
13Thanks to my colleague Jim Rubenstein who shared his plant-level
data for the 150 largest supplier companies.
14Mexican data are available for 601 plants, but have not yet been
scrutinized to the same extent.
15I construct that variable from the database, utilizing plant names
and company information. It is possible that some of these single-
plant companies have plants that are not included in the database.
16A map of employment, instead of plant count, looks virtually
identical.
17Based on the shape of the core auto region, I define the “auto
corridor” to be the states and Canadian provinces that represent
the contiguous north–south cluster visible in figure 1. They are
Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Ontario, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Wisconsin. Mississippi and Alabama are included as they re-
cently received new assembly plants.
18Maquiladora plants in northern Mexico were established by the
1965 Border Industrialization Program. This program allowed U.S.
companies to assemble products in Mexico destined for export
elsewhere. Later companies from other countries also established
such plants near the northern Mexico border.14 3Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
19Of all domestic assembly plants operating in the U.S, 38 percent
are located within 100 miles of Detroit. The corresponding figure
for foreign-owned assembly plants is only 7 percent.
20Note that 17 percent of plants have no information on their union
status. Therefore, this comparison (see columns 6 and 7) only ap-
plies to 83 percent of the records.
21The geographic coordinates for the zip code centroids come from
the Maptitude GIS program. The distance between the two sets of
coordinates is given by the following formula: acos(sin(la1)*sin(las)
+ cos(la1)*cos(la2)*cos(lo2 – lo1))*6370*.62, where la1 and lo1
are the latitude and longitude (in radians) of the zip code centroid
of the supplier plant and la2 and lo2 are the coordinates for the
zip code centroid of downtown Detroit.
22As explained earlier, tier 1 suppliers are the ones that interact directly
with the assembler. One would have to know the identity of a
supplier’s customer plants in order to identify that group. The top 150
variable tries to proxy for that relationship in the absence of such
detailed customer information. The underlying assumption is that
the vast majority of tier 1 suppliers happen to be large companies.
23In the estimation we treat plants with unknown union status as
not unionized. Based on size and location these plants are very
similar to plants identified as nonunion.
24The ELM data provide information on what parts an individual
plant produces in a very detailed way. Unfortunately, it does not
provide the distribution of actual output across the various parts.
The ELM parts classification system distinguishes 20 subsystems
in a car (table 5). Altogether, it identifies 492 individual parts. Uti-
lizing the relative frequency of the detailed parts listed for each plant,
we converted this information on what each plant produces into a
more aggregate system that distinguishes only 8 subsystems. They
are body, chassis, drivetrain, engine attached (such as the exhaust
system), engine electrical, engine proper, generic parts, as well as
interior parts. The subsystem variables measure the share of indi-
vidual parts codes in each of these by plant.
25A small downside of utilizing the information on plant age is
that it is missing for 19 percent of the data. However, there seems
to be no relation between that and the location of plants. For a
slightly different treatment of such an estimation, see Klier, Ma,
and McMillen (2004).
26Table 7 reports results for supplier pants that were not older
than 10 years in 2003 (1994-2003). Estimating the model for a
smaller set of “young” plants, the ones that opened between 1999
and 2003, yields robust results.
27Estimating the county-level model for the auto corridor only as
well as for the entire U.S. produces robust results.
28To test for robustness of this exercise, I performed the same ex-
periment on the model that estimates the location determinants
for all supplier plants that opened between 1999 and 2003. The
resulting redistribution of suppliers, while different in absolute
numbers, represents a relative change of a similar order of mag-
nitude as described above.
29That result is found to be robust when basing it on the locations
of foreign supplier plants that opened since 1999 instead.15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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